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The End of Utopia? 
 
The concepts of ‘utopia’ and ‘ideology’ were key elements in political debate in 
the 20th century, but they seem to have lost their centrality in political discourse in recent 
decades. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many intellectuals and the media 
announced the demise of utopia. The so-called ‘end of utopia’ coincided with the collapse 
of communist regimes and ideologies (Eagleton, 1991; Jacoby, 1999). Fukuyama (1992) 
went even further by declaring ‘the end of history’. Inspired by Kojève’s reading of 
Hegel, he conceived of history as a dialectical struggle between two antagonistic 
ideologies. With the breakdown of the USSR, liberalism no longer had a counterpart. 
Liberalism, for Fukuyama, was not merely the accidental winner of the ideological battle; 
he was also convinced that the combination of the liberal democratic system and market 
capitalism represented the definitive culmination of the ideological progress of humanity. 
With this political and economic structure now achieved, we are living in the dreamed-of 
utopia. At this stage, we do not need utopian visions or ideological debates to motivate 
collective actions towards change. This means that the historical dynamic has reached a 
final stage and no relevant political change can be expected after 1990. The only thing 
that remains to do is to administer resources and solve minor conflicts. Of course, history 
contradicted any prediction of its unfolding and the unforeseeable did happen: we saw 
the emergence of the Internet, new forms of terrorism, natural disasters, economic and 
demographic crisis, and so on. These are only a few examples of historical events that 
have inevitably changed our self-understanding. Thus, historical and social change warns 
us to be cautious and to constantly readjust our projects, expectations, hopes, desires, and 
forecasts. 
 But if history has not come to an end, what has happened to ideologies and 
utopias? Are they still playing a role in politics or have they now virtually disappeared 
from the scene? The words ‘utopia’ and ‘ideology’ are still in use in common parlance, 
but their sense is frequently pejorative. After the political catastrophes of the 20th century, 
we tend to identify ‘ideology’ with political bigotry when this is made explicit, or with 
undercover machinations behind apparently neutral political programs. There is a 
common assumption that ‘what persuades men and women to mistake each other from 
time to time for gods or vermin is ideology’. (Eagleton, 1991, p. xiii). We also label 
daydreamers as ‘utopian’, as well as any political projects that are humanly unfeasible to 
complete. We avoid ideologies as we avoid radicalism. The same has happened with 
utopias. As Jacoby puts it, someone ‘who believes in utopias is widely considered out to 
lunch or out to kill’ (Jacoby, 1999, p. xi). It is ideology’s flirting with power and utopia’s 
flirting with disaster that prevent us from relying on them as relevant sources of political 
motivation. 
 The conceptual history of the terms shows that their ambiguity was already present 
from the beginning. The classical definition of the terms is attributed to the sociologist 
Karl Mannheim. He defined ‘utopia’ as a state of mind which is ‘incongruous with the 
state of affairs within which it occurs’ (Mannheim, 1996, p. 177). Further characteristics 
in Mannheim’s definition are that: (i) utopia is oriented towards an object which does not 
exist in the actual situation; (ii) it transcends the immediate situation, and (iii) it may 
shatter (partially or wholly) the order of things. Ideology is assumed to have similar traits: 
it is a negation of the current state of affairs and has the potential to distort reality in favor 
of the interests of a hegemonic group. However, utopia has a distinctive goal: it tends to 
‘burst the bonds of the existing order’ (Mannheim, 1966, p. 173). We could sum up 
Mannheim’s distinction between utopia and ideology as follows: whereas ideologies seek 
to reinforce the power of dominant groups in society, utopias generally have been a means 
to fulfill the interests of the oppressed. Mannheim reckons that this distinction can 
sometimes be very subtle. Mannheim’s approach to ideologies and utopias was part of a 
larger project: the study of political ideas should lead to a sociology of knowledge that 
approaches political values and beliefs in the context of tensions among distinct political 
groups. Utopias and ideologies do exist, but they exist in conflict: their frictions reflect 
the current interplay of forces within a given society. Bearing this in mind, Mannheim 
distinguishes between evaluative and non-evaluative uses of the term. This is to say that 
no political rationale is free of values, beliefs, hopes or desires. Eagleton (1991), who has 
worked on the meaning of ‘ideology’, also states that there are many senses of the term. 
Some are evaluative, but some are cognitive and just take into account that ideologies, as 
social productions of ideas, can be held by different groups (hegemonic or not). When we 
make use of the term ‘ideology’, we often want to discredit our opponents. Our reluctance 
to admit that our point of view might be ideological is well explained by Eagleton’s 
metaphor: ‘Ideology, like halitosis, is in this sense what the other person has’ (Eagleton, 
1991, p. 2).  
 In this paper, I would like to focus more on utopia and political imagination. My 
reason for this is the near coincidence in time of several advertising campaigns using 
utopian language and of an upsurge of social movements in which the utopian element 
was present. This happened in an era that had been labeled the ‘end of utopia’ (Jacoby, 
1999). Since Mannheim’s definition and typology of utopias, the concept has died several 
times. Mannheim himself prophesied that the advancement of industrialized society and 
the rationalization of political processes would lead to the ‘elimination of reality-
transcending elements of our world’ and this would mean ‘the decay of the human will’ 
(Mannheim, 1966, p. 222). In 1967, Herbert Marcuse published an essay entitled ‘The 
End of Utopia’. The end of utopia, according to Marcuse, signaled ‘the refutation of those 
ideas and theories that use the concept of utopia to denounce certain socio-historical 
possibilities’ (Marcuse, 1970, p. 62).1 For Marcuse, utopia, as an exercise of political 
imagination, is necessary to develop alternative projects of social experience. 
Nevertheless, he was quite pessimistic about the real chances of any alternative project to 
the ideology of capitalism in advanced industrial societies. In One-Dimensional Man 
(1964), he had already stated the slim likelihood of success for what he called ‘The Big 
Refusal’. In Marcuse’s view, within the technological society of advanced capitalism ‘a 
pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior prevents any form of protest’ (Marcuse, 
1964, p. 12). The comfortable life in affluent society produces its own form of ideology, 
which inhibits any sign of reaction, since ‘ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their 
content transcend the established universe of discourse and action, are either repelled or 
reduced to terms of this universe’ (Marcuse, 1964, p. 12). Marcuse paid special attention 
to works of art. Even artists considered marginal or subversive in their time have been 
integrated as merchandise in the free market. In this integration, they lose their truth, their 
potential rejection of the social reality (Marcuse, 1964, p. 58). Who cares now about Van 
Gogh’s painful delirium, his suffering at the margins of the good society, the radical 
novelty of his expressive style? Today we can have a poster of ‘Starry Night’ hanging 
over our bed, if the painting goes with the rest of our furnishings. If not, we can hang a 
reproduction of Klimt’s ‘The Kiss’ or a colorful Gauguin. More recently, Bauman has 
expressed a similar idea by pointing to the extraordinary capacity of consumer society to 
absorb any form of dissent and ‘then to recycle it, as a major resource of its own 
production, reinvigoration and expansion’ (Bauman, 2007, p. 48). Consumer society, for 
Bauman, represents the end of the political, as it did for Marcuse. Consumerism and 
commodification numb political consciousness by appealing to sensuality and comfort. 
To put it bluntly: consumerism and politics, in Marcuse’s and Bauman’s scheme, seem 
to be mutually exclusive of one another. 
 Jacoby writes in 1999 about an ‘era of acquiescence’ in which we are ‘asked to 
choose between the status quo or something worse. Other alternatives do not seem to 
exist’ (Jacoby, 1999, p. xi). Since the fall of communism, a new consensus has emerged, 
that political ideas should be restricted to pragmatic solutions to discrete problems. As 
Jacoby puts it: ‘the twentieth century is not an unbroken story of a declining utopian 
vision. In the wake of the Russian Revolution, in the 1920s around the surrealists and 
again in the 1960s utopian ideas flared up – and burned out. [...] Although scholarly 
studies of utopianism persist, across the land a utopian spirit is dead or dismissed’ 
(Jacoby, 1999, p. 158-159). 
 If capitalism has such power to gobble up any attempt at resistance, why reclaim 
the old-fashioned utopian discourse? It seems obvious to me that, as Marcuse posed it, 
capitalism is ideological but also has its own utopia. I agree with Ruth Levitas’s statement 
that utopias cannot be reduced to literary fiction or political blueprints and that 
‘utopianism in the sense of visualizing, hoping for, and working for a better world is an 
enduring and essential element of human aspiration and political culture’ (Levitas, 2010, 
p. xiii). This does not mean that utopian forms are always innocent. Utopias may be 
stimulating and positive, but they can also serve to distort and delude. There might be a 
path by which fostering people’s hopes and desires for a better world (a utopian vision) 
results in the reinforcement of the status quo and the dominant position of social groups 
(an ideological strategy). The conceptual proximity between utopia and ideology, their 
political ambiguity, leads sometimes to the confusion of the terms.  
 Surely, utopian discourse ought to be the subject of much criticism, especially 
because of its flirtation with ideologies, understood here as intentional distortions of 
reality to legitimate political domination.2 This inherent ambiguity of utopia and ideology 
may be an unavoidable problem; nevertheless, the potential of utopian discourse to 
mobilize and influence human action deserves careful examination. Human agents make 
decisions by weighing reasons, but such reasons are not their only source of motivation. 
John Dewey observed as early as 1927 in his work The Public and Its Problems that 
‘emotional habituations and intellectual habitudes on the part of the mass of men create 
the conditions of which exploiters of sentiment and opinion only take advantage’ (Dewey, 
1984, p. 341). For Dewey, habits of thought are important since habit ‘does not preclude 
the use of thought, but it determines the channels within which it operates’ (Dewey, 1984, 
p. 335). This is not far from Bordieu’s analysis of habitus and structures: structures 
function as an environment that reproduces habits as abiding dispositions without the 
conscious participation of social agents or external conductors. Structures provide, so to 
speak, common sense; the meaning of individual action is given by the dialectical 
interplay between the individual seeking a meaningful life and the social possibilities of 
sense making (Bordieu, 1977, p. 72-80). 
 In his analysis of ideologies, Eagleton (1991) suggests that the concept itself has 
different levels of application: genetic (the production of ideas), epistemic (ideas and 
beliefs already existing in society), and political (relating to power). Levitas places desire 
at the heart of utopia, ‘a desire for a different, better way of being’ (Levitas, 2010, p. 209). 
We could interpret this in the same sense as Dewey’s assertion: political persuasion 
involves argumentative and non-argumentative elements. As Jasper has recently claimed, 
our rationalistic traditions of analysis have systematically ignored the non-argumentative 
elements of decisions (Jasper, 2011, p. 298). In particular, he sees hope and the desire to 
have an effect on the world as the greatest spur to action (Jasper, 2011, p. 291). According 
to Jasper, feelings, emotions, affective loyalties, connection through collective identities, 
rituals and routines, and group dynamics all play a crucial role, as well as argumentation 
and rational persuasion, in the mobilization of social movements. In addition, Gerbaudo 
(2012), who has studied the social movements emerging in 2011, concludes that some 
sort of emotional condensation precedes the physical precipitation of movements in 
public spaces.  
 To sum up: persuading political agents to assume a political project may involve 
an appeal to good reasons but also the fostering of people’s desires and hopes for a better 
life. The appeal to reasons and the fostering of hopes and desires are traits that political 
argumentation has in common with marketing and advertising. Again, in Levitas’s words, 
‘utopian images may be used for manipulative purposes. Much advertising uses images 
of the good life (the idyllic island, the sophisticated life of leisure and consumption, the 
cozy nuclear family) to sell products. Advertisements work, though, because they key 
into utopian images which are already present among the audience, reflecting their 
desires, their lack’ (Levitas, 2010, p. 219). Utopian language and images may have 
abandoned the public political debate but they are still a means to influence people in 
many ways. Utopias still enjoy a robust life. 
 The three pieces of advertising analyzed in this paper make use of utopian 
language and images in a time said to be too realistic for any belief in utopias (Jacoby, 
1999). An unavoidable problem of the analysis is to identify the motivations that lie 
behind the use of these utopian images because, as we have seen, ambiguity is an intrinsic 
feature of utopias and ideologies. As a result, we cannot always reach unequivocal 
answers. In this essay, the approach to these questions is philosophical, i.e., a reflection 
on the meaning of some social phenomena that are taken here as representative of our 
media culture. 
 The analysis of the three uses of utopian rhetoric in advertising has been conducted 
with attention to the following aspects: (a) a reconstruction of the internal narrative of the 
adverts; (b) an exposition of the external elements related to the setting of these narratives; 
(c) a contextualization of the utopian images with a focus on the audiences they intend to 
reach; and (d) the effect and reception of the utopian images on the audiences. I think 
these examples can show that (i) utopian rhetoric is or is not incorporated in the collective 
imaginary depending on their potential accommodation within it; (ii) their effect involves 
a plurality of elements that transcend their internal narrative and the original purposes of 
the advertisers.  
 
Advertising and Utopia: Reasons to Believe in a Better World 
 
The first case presented here is the campaign launched by Coca-Cola® in 2011, 
entitled ‘There are reasons to believe in a better world’. The company declared that the 
main motivation for the campaign was clearly to spread hope and happiness all over the 
world:  
 
For every reason to fear, there is a reason to hope. For every reason to give 
up or give in, there is a reason to dig deep and try harder. And for every reason 
to doubt, there are countless reasons to believe in a better tomorrow. 
That’s the message behind a topical Coca-Cola campaign that celebrates the 
notion that, despite ongoing economic uncertainty, political unrest, natural 
disasters and more, the good in today’s world far outweighs the bad.3 
 
According to the press note issued by Coca-Cola® in December 2012, the original 
idea was born in Mexico and Colombia the year before. In the advertisement, a youth 
chorus sings while images and words are projected onto the background. The reaction in 
Latin America was so enthusiastic that the ad has been adapted in more than 70 countries 
worldwide. Each country has its own local adaptation. For instance, the Japanese version 
seeks to bolster a society that was devastated by an earthquake in 2011.4 In Egypt, the 
campaign was adapted for Ramadan ‘by reinforcing the greater good of humanity in a 
post-Arab Spring environment’. A ‘dose of happiness’ was delivered to European 
countries going through a deep economic crisis, such as Greece, Italy and Spain. Javier 
Sánchez Lamelas, marketing VP for Latin America, explained that the idea was to say to 
people around the world going through tough times that things will get better and that 
‘Coca-Cola is the brand that can provide this reassurance’.5  
In the UK version, the advertisement begins with a list of reasons to believe in a 
better world supposedly supported by data that was obtained from a scientific study on 
the real situation of the world in 2010 (indeed, the original source is never quoted). We 
see a group of children singing all together while their teacher, a young man, plays the 
guitar. The children in the class, all about 8-10 years old, represent the cultural and racial 
diversity of the country. They sing ‘Whatever’, a hit from the 1990s and the British band 
Oasis. While they sing, reasons to believe in a better world are being opposed to the bad 
things occurring in the world, reasons to be pessimistic. Every reason, the good and the 
bad, is illustrated through evocative images. Here is an extract of the reasons listed in the 
advertisement: 
 
For every tank being built in the world…  
131,000 stuffed dolls are made. 
For each stock market that crashes… 
there are 10 covers of ‘What a Wonderful World’. 
For every corrupt person… 
there are 8,000 giving blood. 
For every wall that it is put up… 
20,000 ‘Welcome’ mats are placed. 
Worldwide, more Monopoly money is printed than dollars. 
There are more funny videos on the web… 
than bad news around the world. 
While a scientist is creating a new weapon… 
1 million moms are baking chocolate cakes. 
LOVE has more results (on Google) than FEAR. 
For every weapon sold in the world… 
20,000 share a Coke. 
 
The emotional impact of the advertisement is positive. If the goal of the campaign 
is to put a smile on our face, it is definitely a success. What could be more inspiring than 
to see all those beautiful kids singing in harmony while moms are baking tasty chocolate 
cakes, cuddly stuffed teddy bears are being manufactured and lots of people are Googling 
‘love’ on the Internet, perhaps thinking of their loved ones? However, if we analyze the 
images one-by-one, we see that the illustrations of reasons might not be so balanced. The 
images corresponding to the market crash show a hectic trading floor. The example of a 
corrupt person is a cartoon of an executive with dollar bills exploding out of his head. 
Shortly afterwards, we see many red balloons filling a blue sky to illustrate the fact that 
8,000 people are donating blood (every year? in the UK? around the world?). The weapon 
created by a scientist is an enormous rocket being launched into the air. We are not 
confronted with an image that genuinely shows us what the weapon can do or what its 
deadly effect might be. The visual language used in the advertisement refers to blood as 
a red balloon, not as a viscous fluid leaking from a dead body. As an example of funny 
videos on the Internet, we see a cute baby smiling. A groom slipping and falling next to 
his bride at their wedding ceremony represents its negative counterpart, the huge amount 
of bad news in the world. This is of course more humorous than tragic. The last two 
reasons are quite symmetric in their composition but their connotations differ hugely. We 
read ‘While one weapon is sold in the world’ behind an army on parade. The 
corresponding reason to believe in a better world (‘20,000 share a Coke’) is written on 
top of an image with lots of beautiful children holding a Coke distributed spatially in a 
formation similar to the military one but looking in the opposite direction, as if they were 
actually in dialogue, confronting one another. The good intentions of the campaign are 
not in question here. However, the juxtaposition of good and bad reasons is proposed in 
terms that clearly lend more weight to the bright side of life. Needless to say, you cannot 
fight a tank just by sharing a Coke. 
Of course, it is possible to argue at this point that the weight you put on a reason 
is completely subjective: that the birthday cake your mom baked you was more worth 
remembering than all your bad days in primary school added together. The way we judge 
the real situation of our world depends on personal choice. The presumed reasons for 
believing in the campaign are not based upon quantitative facts, but upon the existence of 
human emotions and dispositions that have a positive quality. The use of utopian 
discourse calls for staying hopeful amid uncertainty, hopeful because of a few good 
feelings, and the notion that good sense will, in the end, win out over thousands of 
examples of evil. This could be a positive interpretation of the sense of the campaign. 
Another, less positive interpretation could be that the campaign uses utopia without 
aiming at a radical transformation of uncertain circumstances. Moreover, it suggests that 
things will improve if we keep reasonably attached to the values of the well-meaning 
middle class. 
 
Advertising, Utopia and History: From Ironic Play to Commemoration 
 
  The critically acclaimed film ‘Good Bye, Lenin!’ (2003) by Wolfgang Becker 
contains a very powerful scene in which the young Alexander Kremer is desperately 
trying to persuade his sick mother that everything outside her room is as it has always 
been in the GDR. Precisely in this instant, an unmistakable sign that everything has 
changed forever appears at Alex’s back: a huge Coca-Cola® billboard is being unfurled 
from one of the highest buildings in Alexanderplatz in Berlin. It is interesting to observe 
that if there is a brand that we, in our imaginary, identify with capitalism, that brand is 
Coca-Cola®, bringing refreshment and happiness to the world for 127 years. 
A few years ago, in the Eberswalderstraβe, not far from Alexanderplatz, you could 
buy city souvenirs in a shop called ‘East Berlin’.6 The shop’s sign is rather revealing: the 
typography paid clear homage to Coca-Cola®. Berliners, well-known for their keen sense 
of irony, are quite used to this kind of aesthetic play. The souvenir shop was simply 
representing a widespread phenomenon in former Communist countries, especially in the 
former GDR. On the day after the wall fell, chunks of it were already being sold as gifts 
and oddities. It has happened exactly as Marcuse foresaw: in a one-dimensional world, 
the hegemonic ideology incorporates its antagonist as a part of its discourse. In this case, 
the past antagonist becomes a lucrative investment for the future. Another example of the 
exchange value of the past can be seen in the Louis Vuitton® ad of 2007 showing Mikhail 
Gorbachev riding in a car along the Berlin Wall with a classic Vuitton bag on the seat 
beside him. Other celebrities photographed by Annie Leibovitz for the campaign were 
Steffi Graf, Andre Agassi and Catherine Deneuve.7 The advert has an ironic effect if we 
bear in mind that Gorbachev was the last leader of the Soviet Union, a political project 
that collapsed shortly after the wall in Berlin did. Some critics have gone further in their 
analysis of the photo and noticed something curious that would have passed unnoticed if 
it were not for their clinical eye. Inside the open bag, there is a book or a journal with a 
headline in Cyrillic: ‘The Murder of Litvinenko: They Wanted to Give Up the Suspect 
for $7,000’. Dan Levin  provided background for the headline in an article written for the 
New York Times in 2007: ‘The reference is to Alexander V. Litvinenko, the former 
K.G.B. spy who died last November after being poisoned with a radioactive isotope, 
polonium 210. On his deathbed, Mr. Litvinenko accused President Vladimir V. Putin of 
orchestrating his murder; the British authorities have accused one of Mr. Litvinenko’s 
associates, Andrei K. Lugovoi, of the crime, and have requested his extradition from 
Russia, which the Kremlin has refused’.8 As the translation of the headline was circulating 
in the Internet, Pietro Beccari, director of marketing at Ogilvy & Mather, Louis Vuitton’s 
agency, denied any intention to deliver a subliminal political message, since the intention 
of the portraits was simply to reflect on ‘personal journeys’. The presence of the 
newspaper is said to be merely ‘coincidental’ and ‘serendipitous’. Gorbachev has said 
that he was unaware of the presence of the headline in the bag beside him.9 
Without a doubt, Germany’s reunification has been one of the most important 
milestones in recent history. Many of us may remember the moving images of joy on 
November 9, 1989. That day in Berlin was the result of very complex processes taking 
place all across the GDR, especially in Leipzig, where the peaceful Montagdemos 
marched from the Nikolaikirche around the Runde Ecke to the Dittrichring (where the 
Stasi district headquarters stood), with more than 100,000 people walking behind a banner 
declaring Wir sind das Volk (‘We are the people’).10 
The people of Leipzig are still very proud of the Friedliche Revolution, the 
peaceful revolution that led to Germany’s reunification and that featured Leipzig as one 
of its main scenes. A meaningful example is the Deutsche Telekom® commercial of 
2009. The commercial was shot on November 8, one day before the 20th anniversary of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the commercial, we see an ordinary rush hour on an ordinary 
day in the beautiful Central Railway Station in Leipzig. Suddenly a man sings, ‘Guten 
Tag! Hallo!’ (‘Good morning! Hello!’) from the top of the stairs. ‘Hallo!’ repeats the 
man. ‘Hallo!’ answers a crowd of 1,000 Leipzigers. ‘Freude!’ (Joy!) adds the man 
introducing the tune. ‘Freude!’ replies the crowd exuberantly. Then, all together, they 
start to sing: ‘Freude, schöner Götterfunken, Töchter aus Elisium. Wir betreten 
feuertrunken, himmlische, dein Heiligtum’. At this point, the famous opera singer Paul 
Potts joins the man on the stairs and sings the same verse. Then, the Leipzigers, the first 
man and Paul Potts together sing the whole anthem, which is called ‘An die Freude’ (‘Ode 
to Joy’). The choice of the musical piece is no accident. The text was written by the poet 
Friedrich Schiller not far from the railway station, in Leipzig-Gohlis, a district in the north 
of Leipzig.11 The music comes from Ludwig van Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. This 
piece has become the anthem of the European Union and it symbolizes the union of the 
people in peaceful, harmonious coexistence. The commercial ends with the text Grenzen 
gabs gestern (Limits belong to the past), in colloquial German. This is a nice play on 
words, since Grenzen means both ‘borders’ and ‘limits’. People living in the GDR use to 
talk about the wall as ‘die Grenze’ (the border). Thus, the sentence picked by Deutsche 
Telekom® has two clear references: ‘borders belong to the past’ (a reference to the 
historical past, the wall as the boundary that divided the two Germanies) and ‘limits 
belong to the past’ (a reference to the present in communications, the company offers 
services that make quick communication possible). With this campaign, Deutsche 
Telekom® offered the possibility to unify its diverse products and services (DSL, mobile 
phone, television, and so on.) in a single contract rate.  
From my view, the commercial is interesting for several reasons. First, the 
commercial does not explain the advantages of picking Telekom® as a telecoms operator; 
it refers to one of the most important moments in Germany’s recent history. That is 
different from what we usually expect from a piece of advertising, e.g., to convince us of 
the advantages of picking a certain product. We can interpret the commercial as a genuine 
and touching commemoration of the civil courage that brought Germany to reunification. 
In this sense, the commercial is very original: it promises to join and preserve this spirit 
of peaceful coexistence. Second, the advert shows, I think intentionally, a picture of civil 
society in Leipzig that differs hugely from the one existing at the time of the Wende (as 
people in Germany call the process of reunification). We see young families with 
children, elderly people, students12 from Germany and abroad.13 By doing this, the 
commercial is not only advertising a communications platform and commemorating the 
past, it is also advertising the city of Leipzig. It shows a city bound up with past demands 
for democracy (represented by the elderly generation) and also a city open to future 
generations and newcomers (represented in the picture by young families, students from 
Leipzig and abroad). And, of course, it is a city where everyone is ready to sing the ‘Ode 
to Joy’ jubilantly and spontaneously, on demand. Third, the commercial establishes a 
connection between the lack of limits in communication and the disappearance of the 
political boundaries that divided Germany into two nations in conflict. This may suggest 
quite different things. For instance, that the people’s will to be united can be stronger than 
any political ideology. Alternatively, it may suggest that the existence of better 
communication networks can be a powerful counterweight to artificial political 
antagonisms. It might be interesting to recall how the peaceful revolution took place. The 
weight of the peaceful revolution was borne largely by the GDR population. It began with 
small meetings inside the Nikolaikirche and when the GDR authorities did not suppress 
these gatherings, the spark spread all over the GDR and the longing for democracy 
became impossible to extinguish. It might have been the intention of the Telekom® 
campaign to suggest that a united and well-connected civil society will be stronger against 
the ghosts of division.  
The motto of the campaign was Erleben, was verbindet (‘Living, what keeps us 
together’). In fact, Deutsche Telekom® announced that all SMS would be free of charge 
on November 9, 2009.14 This contrasts with the history of the company itself.  Deutsche 
Telekom® has its origins in a state company, the Deutsche Bundespost (the German 
Federal Postal Service). From 1947, the state company also ran the telephone network in 
West Germany. In the GDR, the telephone service was part of the Post Office Ministry. 
After reunification, in 1990, the Deutsche Bundespost was divided into three companies 
(Postbank, Postdienst and Deutsche Bundespost Telekom), all of which remained under 
state control. In fact, Deutsche Telekom® came into existence only in 1996 after the 
privatization of Deutsche Bundespost Telekom. In the years 2005 and 2006, Deutsche 
Telekom intended to fire more than 50,000 employees because of a deep financial crisis, 
but the conflict has been solved.15 Today Deutsche Telekom® is present in 50 countries 
and has more than 140 million clients.  
 
Advertising a New Utopia? 
 
It is interesting to observe that what happened in the Deutsche Telekom® example 
is a clear case of the appropriation of the historical past by a private enterprise. But no 
one has pointed out this fact during the whole campaign: the commercial was very 
successful in Germany. There has been no criticism of the company taking advantage of 
the historical legacy of a reunited Germany, which is a common good. Indeed, the 
reactions have been very positive and emotional. The commercial won an Elfie, the most 
important award in marketing in Germany.16 
This is quite different from what happened with the advertising campaign of 
Movistar® (a subsidiary of Telefonica®) in Spain in November 2011. In the preceding 
months, Spain had faced unexpected upheaval, which started on May 15 in the squares 
and streets of the country’s major cities. Waves of social protest, which came to be known 
as ’15-M’ or ‘indignad@s’17 (the outraged), resulted in the occupation of public squares 
for weeks, with the protesters representing a broad cross-section of Spanish society: 
students, the jobless, retirees, activists and the apolitical, the young and the old (Castells, 
2012, p. 115). The popular outburst did not follow a definite ideology or program 
(Antentas & Vivas, 2012; Castells, 2012; Sitrin & Azzellini, 2014). What all of the 
protesters had in common were two fundamental convictions: (1) there is no hope for 
citizens in capitalism’s current crisis, and (2) our duty as citizens is to reclaim the original 
meaning of ‘democracy’. ‘Shame on this democracy!’ was the cry that rang out in the 
streets. The banks and corporations are the ones taking decisions while ordinary citizens 
foot the bill and struggle on, bearing the consequences of their irresponsibility. We have 
to take democracy from the hands of the politicians and bankers and give it back to those 
to whom it really belongs: to us, the people.18 The political content of the movement was 
therefore twofold. On the one hand, the movement began among the hopeless, the 
desperate, those whose expectations had been systematically frustrated. They did not have 
any concrete plan for the future: they were claiming simply that the situation was too 
severe to allow things to get even worse. The popular reaction, however, was so powerful 
and categorical that a collective hope suddenly emerged. Extemporaneous communities 
were born under the May sun. People who had nothing better to do because there was 
nothing better to do, devoted their entire days to a new occupation: joining in an exciting, 
genuine debate on the essence of democracy. In this sense, outrage constituted a new 
hope, a real feeling of togetherness (Antentas & Vivas, 2012; Castells, 2012). 
Castells (2012) suggests that the 15-M movement was indeed a ‘rhizomatic 
revolution’. Its distinctive feature, and perhaps one of the keys to its rapid success, was 
that it appealed to a majority of the Spanish population. The movement was said to be 
horizontal, non-ideological, spontaneous, and lacking conscious organization or political 
leadership. Gerbaudo, however, has argued that it was not particularly spontaneous, since 
the campaign launched by Democracia Real Ya ‘was supported by thousands of Internet 
users and also by 200 civil society organizations’ (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 87). As the 
movement jumped from a Facebook page to the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, its impact 
expanded quickly to 57 other Spanish cities. Local assemblies and communication 
networks were built (Sitrin & Azzellini, 2014). It was possible to know what was 
happening elsewhere in the country and to coordinate joint action thanks to the use of 
social media (Gerbaudo, 2012). Thousands of videos in YouTube, some of them quite 
professional,19 advertised the movement and invited people from Spain and abroad to 
join. 
During the months of the Spanish Revolution, a feeling quite close to hope took 
hold in people’s hearts. They discovered that it was possible to engage in a profound 
debate on Spain’s economic and institutional crisis without intermediaries. It was an 
experiment in what real direct democracy could look like. It is hard to describe the 
emotional state resulting from 15-M and it is also difficult to know what has remained of 
it in the months and years afterwards. This might be why the advertising campaign of the 
Telefonica subsidiary Movistar® over Christmas 2011, a few months after this high-
spirited moment, caused such an uproar.  
The commercial shows some sort of local assembly, emulating the rich diversity 
of people gathering in the popular assemblies of 15-M. The participants are discussing 
the most advantageous flat rates for potential clients of the mobile operator. Their 
dialogue goes like this: 
 
Man 1 (young, in his thirties): Let’s talk one after the other, OK? 
Woman 1 (young, same age, Latin-American accent): I would ask them not 
to charge for text messages that give good news... for instance to wish 
someone a happy birthday or when someone gets married... 
Man 2 (about 60 years old, maybe a retiree): That is not always good news...20 
Woman 2 (about 35 years old): How are they supposed to know whether the 
news is good or bad? 
Woman 3 (about 70 years old): Nowadays, cell phones are so sophisticated 
that they can even tell your blood-sugar level! 
Man 3 (age between 35 and 45, in suit): I think it is just the opposite... it is 
better not to pay for something bad ... if you have a cold and you can’t go to 
work.... 21 
Man 4 (teenager): Is that bad news? 
Man 1: Why not ask them for all text messages to be free? 
Man 2: That won’t happen... 
Man 1: We can ask, we have nothing to lose... OK, who votes for this? 
(Everyone raises their hands) 
In off: The people have spoken and this is what they asked from us. New flat 
rates for cell phones, agreed by all. Text messaging free. Pay less if you use 
DSL. Movistar: Life is so much more, when we share it! 
 
The commercial caused indignation and was accused of being a vulgar parody of 
the Spanish Revolution. Telefonica subsidiary Movistar® argued that the commercial was 
originally thought of as an homage to 15-M. The company surely did not expect to offend 
people’s sensibilities. In fact, many voices interpreted the company’s campaign as an 
effort to ideologically discredit the Spanish Revolution. Others saw the commercial as a 
crude attempt to profit from the image of 15-M.22 Almost immediately, the revenge of the 
15-M protesters appeared on YouTube. In their new version, they changed the dialogue 
in protest against Movistar®: despite reported profits of €10.167 billion in 2010, the 
company had fired 6,000 workers in the same year (approximately 20% of its staff). Now 
the people spoke and this is what they said about the quality of services: Telefonica® 
offered the slowest and most expensive DSL in Europe in 2010. The criticism in several 
Internet forums was so intense that only a few days after the launch of the campaign, Luis 
Miguel Gilpérez, director of Movistar Spain®, admitted that the whole idea had been a 
mistake. The company had to apologize for having offended so many people.23 But it was 
already too late: FACUA (a consumer watchdog in Spain), ‘honored’ the commercial as 
the ‘worst piece of advertising in 2011’.24 
 
Closing Remarks: Utopia in the Internet Age 
 
‘They don’t represent us’ was one of the most repeated slogans of the 15-M 
movement. The statement could also refer to any attempt by private companies to 
appropriate the Indignad@s’ spirit. According to Castells, the Spanish Revolution 
‘positioned itself against intermediaries, be they political, media or cultural’ (Castells, 
2012, p. 121). Gerbaudo has opposed Castell’s thesis by paying attention to the influence 
of social media in the orchestrating of what he calls the choreography of assembly. The 
metaphor of choreography stands for liquid organization and soft leadership. In 2011, the 
‘year of the protesters’, the revolutions reclaimed their specificity as they were using the 
tools offered by social media to spread the word and promote instant communication. 
Gerbaudo adds nuance to the self-description of the movements by paying attention to 
the unavoidable mediation of immediacy: ‘immediacy (by definition the absence of 
mediation) cannot be sustained without being thoroughly mediated’ (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 
163). 
The claim of horizontality and decentralization and the use of social media 
characterize the social movements of the 21st century, particularly those taking place in 
2011. They were experimenting with new forms of radical democracy as opposed to the 
hierarchical character of ‘old politics’. As Castells sees it, they were living their own 
utopia: 
 
a new utopia of networked democracy based on local communities and virtual 
communities in interaction. But utopias are not mere fantasy. Most modern 
political ideologies at the roots of political systems (liberalism, socialism, 
communism) originated from utopias. Because utopias become a material 
force by becoming incarnate in people’s minds, by inspiring their dreams, by 
guiding their actions and prompting their reactions. What these networked 
social movements are proposing in their practice is a new utopia at the heart 
of the culture of the network society: the utopia of the autonomy of the subject 
vis-à-vis the institutions of society. (Castells, 2012, p. 228) 
 
 
 Since the Internet belongs to the new utopia, it is interesting that two of the 
examples analyzed here correspond to big telecoms operators with millions of users. But 
is Castells right when he states that ‘the role of the Internet goes beyond instrumentality’ 
(Castells, 2012, p. 229)? These companies, if not political agents themselves, can claim 
to have contributed in a decisive way to the success of the movement. Their position, 
however, is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, they are a part of the economic system 
against which the protesters are reacting; on the other hand, they are facilitating the 
organization of protesters by supplying telecoms services. Similarly, protesters find 
themselves in a dilemma too. They need communication platforms to spread their 
message and organize logistics of protest. However, some of the telecoms operators are 
companies whose recruitment policies may be a part of the very problem they are 
denouncing. Since we are both citizens and consumers, we find ourselves in the situation 
of having to reflect constantly on the meaning of our political projects, but also on the 
means for their realization. 
 Through the examples presented here, we can appreciate the complexity related 
to the survival of utopias, their reception by civil society and the ambiguities involved in 
all the processes in between. In the case of the Coca-Cola® commercial, despite the good 
intentions declared during the campaign, the use of utopian language is intended not to 
mobilize people, but to hint that a better world depends on the correct weighting of 
reasons. The commercial from Deutsche Telekom® reflects the civil consensus in 
Germany that the peaceful revolution in 1989 has brought about a better state of affairs. 
Of course, Germany’s reunification was not frictionless and not all conflicts have been 
solved 25 years afterwards. However, the motto Grenzen gabs gestern found a breeding 
ground in a society that has fought to overcome political division. For this reason, the 
interplay between commemoration and prospects for the future that are contained in the 
motto was received enthusiastically. The last example, from Movistar®, reflects a social 
reality nourished by structural ambivalences. It was a revolution of hopelessness, an 
absence of hope turned into indignation. Indignation ignited collective action, and 
collective action bred hope in a possible deepening of the actual meaning of democracy. 
Big corporations, banks and the central government were held responsible for the crisis 
almost to the same extent. Despite the use of social media to ‘choreograph’ the revolution, 
Spaniards were not ready to forget the problems caused by Telefonica® and its 
recruitment policies, which continue to fuel indignation to the present day.* This explains 
why Spaniards, particularly the ones who had participated in 15-M, were offended by the 
‘appropriation’ of their protest for commercial purposes. 
 Persuasion, the use of utopian images, and visions of a better future all have the 
potential to mobilize non-trivial human action. This may be why social groups and 
political agents of all sorts keep producing ideals and illusions and playing them off 
against one another. Utopias are like a two-way mirror: one side reflects what is wrong 
with the current state of affairs, while the other casts a ray of hope, illuminating a better 
situation that transcends the current one. What we may not recognize immediately are the 
intentions of those wielding the mirror. Therefore, we should be able, from time to time, 
to look through the looking-glass. 
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I want a country that reads more (far left). 
I want a country where justice is speedy and free (far right). 
I want a country where only kisses can shut us up (middle). 
Mataró (Barcelona), November 9, 2014. 
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